NRC INSPECTION MANUAL Inspection Procedure 62709 IIPB CONFIGURATION RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS by Program Applicability & Appendix B
Issue Date: 12/28/00 - 1 - 62709
NRC  INSPECTION  MANUAL IIPB
Inspection Procedure 62709
CONFIGURATION RISK ASSESSMENT
AND RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS
PROGRAM APPLICABILITY:2515, APPENDIX B
62709-01 INSPECTION OBJECTIVE
01.01 The objective of this procedure is to independently assess
the extent of conditions of a licensee’s implementation of
Maintenance Rule (a)(4) requirements after significant problems
associated with the licensee’s configuration risk assessment and
risk management process have been identified.  This procedure can
also be used to independently assess the licensee's use of
probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) and risk assessment tools for
implementing the Maintenance Rule 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requirements.
62709-02 INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS
The scope of the inspection is focused on those specific
requirements listed below that are necessary to assess the adequacy
of the licensee’s implementation of the Maintenance Rule (a)(4)
requirements.  The inspection may involve an in-depth review of the
licensee’s use of PSA and risk assessment tools  for the
configuration risk assessment and risk management process.  Due to
the variation of PSA methodologies and analytical tools used by
licensees, this inspection shall be performed by Regional Senior
Reactor Analysts (SRAs), or Headquarters risk analysts supported by
personnel who are qualified inspectors and have Maintenance Rule
training.  This procedure is to be used in conjunction with
Supplemental  Inspection Procedure 95002, "Inspection for One
Degraded Cornerstone or Any Three White Inputs in a Strategic
Performance Area."
02.01 Scope of SSCs for (a)(4) Assessments. Determine if the
licensee has established an adequate scope of structures, systems,
or components (SSCs) required for 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) assessments.
Select a sample of 10 to 12 SSCs covered by the Maintenance Rule
that the licensee's expert panel has excluded from (a)(4)
assessments.  The sample shall include high safety-significant SSCs
that are not explicitly modeled in the licensee's PSA, and SSCs
which have been removed from the (a)(4) list of SSCs modeled in the
PSA as a result of decisions made by the licensee’s expert panel.
02.02 Configuration Risk Assessments.  Determine if the licensee
has adequately assessed the overall effect on the performance of
safety functions when SSCs are removed from service for
surveillance or maintenance activities.  Obtain plant
operating/maintenance records for at least two or three monthly
periods of high maintenance activities during power operation with
a particular focus on periods when trains of components were
removed from service or when components from different trains were62709 - 2 - Issue Date: 12/28/00
out of service simultaneously for surveillance or maintenance.  In
the case of plant shutdown conditions, select two or three weekly
periods of plant outage surveillance or maintenance activities with
a particular focus on periods of reduced reactor coolant system
inventory, reduced shutdown cooling availability, or reduced
electric power availability.  Evaluate the results of the
licensee's safety assessments of those selected time periods, and
verify the licensee’s safety assessments encompassed all the SSCs
that have significant impact on public health and safety.  If the
licensee had not kept records of prior assessment results, the
SRA/risk analyst shall consider performing independent assessments
of current maintenance activities.
02.03 Risk Management.  Determine if a licensee is using a
reasonable approach to manage the risk of planned configurations
when SSCs are removed from service for surveillance or maintenance
activities.  On the basis of licensee's safety assessments of those
selected maintenance configurations, either during power operation
or shutdown conditions, verify that the licensee has process
controls in place that ensure risk management actions would be
implemented for plant maintenance configurations with risk
increases that exceed risk management action thresholds.  Section
11.3.7 of NUMARC 93-01 provides a detailed discussion of
establishing risk management action thresholds based on
quantitative and qualitative considerations.
62709-03 INSPECTION GUIDANCE
General Guidance
This inspection procedure is to be used to assess the adequacy of
the licensee’s implementation of Maintenance Rule (a)(4)
requirements after significant problems associated with the
licensee’s configuration risk assessment and control process have
been identified by NRC resident inspectors.  Typical significant
problems are failure to consider SSCs that have potentially
significant impact on public health and safety in the scope of
(a)(4) assessments, chronic failures to perform (a)(4) assessments,
inadequate  safety assessments, and inadequate compensatory measures
when risk management action thresholds are exceeded.  Except when
the licensee proposes an alternate method for complying with
specified portions of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4), the methods described in
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.182 will be used to evaluate the activities
of licensees who are required to comply with the Maintenance Rule
(a)(4) provisions.  This regulatory guide endorses NUMARC 93-01,
Section 11, and provides methods acceptable to the NRC for
complying with the Maintenance Rule (a)(4) requirements.  The
SRA/risk analyst should become familiar with RG 1.182, and Section
11 of NUMARC 93-01 before initiating this inspection.  The SRA/risk
analyst should also be aware that licensees may use methods other
than those described in RG 1.182 and NUMARC 93-01 to satisfy the
Maintenance Rule (a)(4) requirements.  Where other methods are
used, the licensee must demonstrate that those methods satisfy the
(a)(4) requirements of the rule.  Where a licensee implements
(a)(4) partly in accordance with RG 1.182 and Section 11 of NUMARC
93-01 and partly in accordance with other methods, the licensee
must demonstrate that those other methods comply with the
applicable parts of the Maintenance Rule (a)(4) statement.
With very few exceptions, licensees would be using the guidance in
Section 11 of NUMARC 93-01.  Before inspecting the implementation
of (a)(4), the SRA/risk analyst should be familiar with the methods
used by other plants that the NRC staff has found acceptable.
A. SSC Scoping ProcessIssue Date: 12/28/00 - 3 - 62709
10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) states in part: "The scope of the assessment may
be limited to structures, systems, and components that a risk-
informed evaluation process has shown to be significant to public
health and safety."  This statement provides an option for
determining the scope of SSCs subject to the (a)(4) assessment that
may not include all SSCs which meet the scoping criteria of 10 CFR
50.65(b)(1) and (b)(2).  If the licensee elects to use a risk-
informed evaluation process to determine the scope of SSCs for the
(a)(4) assessment, the plant’s PSA could be used as an appropriate
mechanism to define the assessment scope.  Typically, the PSA scope
is developed with consideration of dependencies and support
systems.  Through definition of top events, cutsets, and operator
recovery actions, the PSA scope includes those SSCs that could, in
combination with other SSCs, result in significant risk impacts.
Thus, the SSCs subject to an (a)(4) assessment may be limited to
the following scope:
(1) SSCs modeled in the plant’s Level 1, internal events PSA, and
(2) SSCs determined to be high safety-significant by the
Maintenance Rule expert panel based on engineering judgment
and operating experience.
The licensee's PSA model must be of sufficient detail to support
decisions regarding SSC scope determinations.  At the minimum, the
PSA model should have visible and accurate treatment of
dependencies and interfaces among the plant safety functions,
system  responses, and operator actions needed for accident
mitigation.  For (a)(4) assessments, the PSA model should include
both front-line/support system dependencies and support
system/support system dependencies, to the extent that these inter-
system dependencies would have a significant effect on the key
plant safety functions.  Typically, the licensee’s PSA
documentation would provide dependency matrices which show the
systematic evaluation of inter-system dependencies.  Furthermore,
the Initiator and System Dependency Table (i.e., Table 2) of the
plant Risk-Informed Inspection Notebook (also called the SDP
Notebook)  would provide information on the major dependencies
between front-line and support systems.  The SRA/risk analyst could
utilize  the information provided in this Table to verify the
adequacy of the scope of SSCs subject to (a)(4) assessments.  If
the modeling of inter-system dependencies  is determined to be
inadequate, the licensee should either revise the PSA to address
the inter-system dependencies or add the SSCs to the scope of
(a)(4) assessments.
The SRA/risk analyst should be aware of limitations in the
licensee’s PSA. The SRA/inspector should verify that the
Maintenance Rule expert panel compensates for known limitations in
the PSA by using the Maintenance Rule expert panel's experience-
based perspective during the SSC scoping process.  Significant PSA
limitations and how the  Maintenance Rule expert panel addresses
the limitations should be documented in the inspection report.
The SRA/risk analyst should be aware that the results obtained from
any PSA can be highly dependent on the plant configuration and the
system reliability and availability data used to perform the
calculations.  Therefore, licensees should reconsider SSC scope
determinations periodically whenever the plant design is modified,
the PSA is updated, new insights become available from
configuration  management reviews, or new reliability and
availability data become available.
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10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requires that licensees assess and manage risk
that may result from maintenance activities during all modes of
plant operation (i.e., including low power and shutdown
conditions).  An appropriate assessment would include a review of
the current configuration of the plant and the plant configuration
expected during the planned maintenance activity.  Assessing the
current plant configuration as well as expected changes to plant
configuration due to the planned maintenance activities is intended
to ensure that the plant is not inadvertently placed in risk-
significant configurations.  These assessments do not necessarily
require that a quantitative assessment of probabilistic risk be
performed.  The level of sophistication with which such assessments
are performed is expected to vary, based on circumstances involved.
It should be understood that the contribution to risk of a specific
plant configuration depends on both the degree of degradation of
the safety functions and the duration for which the plant is in
that configuration.  However, the majority of available shutdown
risk assessment tools do not allow the effects of duration on
maintenance configurations during plant shutdown conditions to be
easily  assessed.  Therefore, the risk impact of shutdown
configurations may be assessed, at the present time, by considering
only  the effects of degradation of key safety functions.
Furthermore, assessing the degree of safety function degradation
requires  that there be an understanding of the impact of
maintenance activities on the capability of the plant to prevent or
mitigate accidents and transients, as well as the potential impact
of external conditions (e.g., inclement weather, electrical grid
instability, flooding  or seismic events) on plant maintenance
configurations.  The assessments may range  from deterministic
judgments to the use of an on-line PSA tool.
An assessment should be initiated following the discovery of
emergent failures or changes in plant conditions to determine the
safety impact of the failure or change in plant conditions.
However, the reevaluation of prior assessment(s) should not
interfere with, or delay, operator and maintenance crew from taking
timely actions to restore the appropriate SSC to service or taking
compensatory actions before the end of a work shift.  If the SSC is
expeditiously restored to service prior to the performance of the
assessment, the evaluation need not be conducted.
The process for performing these safety  assessments should be
scrutable and repeatable.  Known limitations in the assessment
process should be described in the licensee’s Maintenance Rule
program documentation.  The licensee’s process should be
sufficiently robust and comprehensive to assess maintenance
activities during power operating conditions and low power and
shutdown conditions.  The sophistication of the assessment(s) for
evaluating the risk of a maintenance configuration should be
commensurate with the complexity of the configuration.
Two methods commonly used to evaluate the risk impact of plant
maintenance  configurations are (1) using a plant "risk monitor" and
(2) using a matrix of preanalyzed plant configurations.  Most plant
"risk monitors" are customized to evaluate the risk impact of
maintenance activities on SSCs used to mitigate events and SSCs
which may initiate events (e.g., switchyard maintenance).  The
adequacy and quality of this assessment tool depends on the
fidelity of the PSA model and the accuracy of input assumptions.
It is expected that the scope of the PSA model in a plant "risk
monitor" should reflect the "as-built, as-operated" plant
configuration to ensure a valid estimate of risk associated with
maintenance configurations.  Since fast-computing PSA models have
sometimes been simplified or optimized, the SRA/inspectors should
review the licensee's process to validate the adequacy of the
optimized model.  In particular, attention should be directed to
situations in which the proposed maintenance activities affect SSCs
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emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) concurrently with containment
systems would reduce plant protection at two different levels
(i.e., both accident mitigation and containment performance).  If
the underlying analytical tool does not accurately model
containment performance, then the output of such an analysis may
significantly underestimate the total plant risk.
Additionally, full requantification (rather than cutset editing) of
the PSA model for the assessment of each maintenance configuration
is desirable to assure a greater fidelity of results when multiple
components are involved.  Some versions of "risk monitors" may use
presolved cutsets for the quantification process.  The SRA/risk
analyst should be aware that the fidelity of the results from these
types of "risk monitors" decreases when multiple SSCs are out of
service at the same time and that the risk impact may be
significantly understated.  If a licensee uses this type of "risk
monitor" and the licensee is removing several SSCs from service at
the same time for maintenance activities, then the SRA/risk analyst
needs to assess how the licensee compensates for this loss of
result fidelity.  Vendor or licensee sensitivity studies may
suggest that there is a limit on the number of SSCs which a cutset
editor can reasonably handle.
If a matrix of preanalyzed plant configurations is used for the
assessment, the limitations of the risk matrix should be clearly
identified and the users of this tool should have sufficient
knowledge and familiarity with the tool’s limitations.  The
adequacy of the safety assessment tool(s) should be evaluated by
the licensee’s  Maintenance Rule expert panel to determine the
possible limitations.  The known limitations of the assessment tool
should be described in the licensee’s Maintenance Rule program
documentation, and training on the limitations should be provided.
The SRA/risk analyst should assess the technical adequacy of the
matrix, including how the licensee determined the risk associated
with the equipment outage combinations and how the licensee may
have categorized that risk.  Some high safety-significant SSCs may
not be included in the matrix due to size limitations.  It should
be noted that this approach  is limited due to the number of
allowable configurations which can be considered.  It is possible
that situations will arise whereby unexpected failures of other
SSCs will occur within the scope of the rule after the licensee has
entered  an allowed configuration as specified by the matrix
approach.  This new configuration would then be outside of the
scope of the preanalyzed condition.  The SRA/risk analyst should
determine what methods the licensee employs to determine the
acceptability of the emergent condition and what contingency
measures are in place to maintain plant risk at an acceptable level
during such situations.  At a minimum, the SRA/risk analyst should
verify that the licensee has a program in place to ensure that key
plant safety functions are maintained  even when the resultant
configurations exceed the boundaries of the preanalyzed
configurations.
The specific format of the quantitative assessments used by
licensees may vary.  However, the end result of the assessment
should provide information about the effects of individual
maintenance configurations on plant risk.  The specific measure of
plant risk being considered should be clearly defined (e.g., core
damage frequency,  large early release frequency, or time to
boiling).  In this respect, certain approaches have been shown to
exhibit unique strengths and weaknesses which are specific to the
approach which has been used.  The assessment should consider the
risk impact associated with the proposed maintenance activities for
SSCs used to mitigate events as well as the risk impact for SSCs
that are considered to be event initiators (i.e., scheduling
switchyard maintenance during an emergency diesel outage). 62709 - 6 - Issue Date: 12/28/00
C. Managing Risk
The safety assessments provide insights on the risk-significance of
maintenance activities.  The process for managing risk involves
using results of the assessment(s) in plant decision-making to
control the overall risk impact.  This is accomplished through
careful planning, scheduling, coordinating, monitoring, and
adjusting of maintenance activities.
One objective of risk management is to control the temporary and
cumulative risk increases from maintenance activities so that the
increases in plant’s average baseline risk are maintained within a
minimal range.  This is accomplished by using the result of the
(a)(4) assessment to plan and schedule maintenance so that the risk
increases are limited and to take additional actions beyond routine
work controls to address situations where the temporary risk
increase is above a certain threshold.
Section  11.3.7.2 of NUMARC 93-01 provides the quantitative
thresholds for planned maintenance configurations that require risk
management actions to be established.  The action thresholds are
based on the consideration of incremental core damage probability
(ICDP) and incremental large early release probability (ILERP), or
configuration-specific CDF value, due to the temporary risk
increase of a  planned maintenance configuration.  If a plant
configuration exceeds the quantitative risk thresholds and the
maintenance activity needs to be conducted, then the licensee
should implement the following risk management actions:
 actions to provide increased risk awareness and control,
 actions to minimize duration of maintenance activity,
 actions to minimize magnitude of risk increase.
The implementation of these practices is a prudent approach to
ensure that the risk of maintenance activities involving risk-
significant configurations is effectively managed.  The SRA/risk
analyst should verify that these practices are employed in the
licensee’s process for risk management.
The Probabilistic Safety Assessment Branch (SPSB) and the Quality
Assurance, Vendor Inspection, Maintenance, and Allegations Branch
(IQMB) of the Office of Nuclear Reactor  Regulation (NRR) are
available to assist with specific questions that may arise during
the execution of this procedure.
Specific Guidance
Not all inspection requirements listed in Section 2 of this IP have
to be performed during the inspection.  Depending on the findings
from the execution of Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.13, NRC
management may decide to perform a broad-scope programmatic
inspection of the adequacy of the licensee’s implementation of
Maintenance Rule (a)(4) requirements or a more focused inspection
of selected aspects of the licensee’s configuration risk assessment
and risk management program.  The inspection resources and
inspection scope would be established to support the NRC management
determination. 
03.01 Scope of SSCs for (a)(4) Assessments
From a sample of 10 to 12 SSCs, including high safety-significant
SSCs (e.g., balance-of-plant SSCs) that are not explicitly modeled
in the licensee's PSA and SSCs which have been removed from the
(a)(4) list of SSCs modeled in the PSA as a result of expert panel
decisions, review the licensee's bases for excluding these SSCsIssue Date: 12/28/00 - 7 - 62709
from the scope of SSCs subject to (a)(4) assessments.  Evaluate the
licensee’s bases for excluding SSCs from the scope for (a)(4)
assessments on the basis of probabilistic and deterministic
considerations.
a. Probabilistic Considerations
1. Would the excluded SSC, singularly or in combination with
other SSCs, have a significant impact on the likelihood
of a risk-significant initiating event (e.g., by an order
of magnitude or more) if the SSC was out of service?
2. Does the excluded SSC have no inter-system dependencies
with the support systems modeled in the PSA? (The
licensee should provide the plant systems dependency
matrix for review.)
3. Did the licensee adequately assess the safety
significance of SSCs outside the scope of its PSA? (See
Appendix A.)
4. Is the level of detail of the PSA adequate to support the
SSC scoping determinations? (See Appendix A.)
5. Does the quality of the PSA support the SSC scoping
determinations?
a. Is the SSC correctly modeled in the PSA?
b. Are the assumptions used in the PSA regarding the
SSC valid?
c. Does the licensee’s PSA quality process appear
adequate, using internal and/or industry peer
reviews or other appropriate processes?
6. Are the licensee's PSA truncation limits low enough to
support the SSC scoping determination? (See Appendix A.)
b. Deterministic Considerations
1. Does the excluded SSC have significant operator actions
needed to safely operate the facility or to mitigate an
event?
2. Does the excluded SSC have multiple applications in the
plant and is it susceptible to generic or common-mode
failures that could affect redundant trains or multiple
plant systems?
3. Does the excluded SSC account for the SSC’s functions in
maintaining  containment integrity and/or containment
isolation? 
4. Does the excluded SSC account for the SSC’s safety
functions during low power operation, shutdown,
refueling, and transitional modes of operation?
5. Does the excluded SSC account for the SSC’s safety
functions during external events such as fires,
earthquakes and high winds?
6. Has the SSC been improperly excluded due to in-service
redundant systems that perform the same safety function
and therefore masked the significance of the SSC?
If the SRA/risk analyst identifies problems regarding the scope of
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SRA/risk analyst should expand the sample size to include another
10 SSCs to better assess the extent of the problems.  If the
SRA/risk analyst did not identify any problems and if time permits,
the SRA/risk analyst should also consider expanding the size of the
inspection sample to include another 10 SSCs.
If the SRA/risk analyst identified problems with the scope of the
licensee's SSCs subject to (a)(4) assessments, then the SRA/risk
analyst shall assess the licensee's process(es) for making these
determinations.  Evaluate the licensee’s scoping process on the
basis of the adequacy of the procedural controls and expert panel
decision making.
a. Procedural Controls
1. Was the level of guidance in Maintenance Rule procedures
adequate?
2. Did the licensee follow the requirements of their
Maintenance Rule procedures?
b. Performance of the Maintenance Rule Expert Panel (See
Appendix B)
1. Were the Maintenance Rule expert panel's composition, its
responsibilities, and its methods adequately defined?
2. Did the panel use clear criteria in determining the scope
of SSCs subject to (a)(4) assessments?
3. Did the panel have adequate guidance to address the
technical or analytical limitations of the plant-specific
PSA?
4. Did the panel objectively consider deterministic and PSA
information?
5. Did the panel incorporate lessons learned from its
activities or the experiences  of implementing line
organizations?
6. Were  Maintenance Rule expert panel activities, including
dissenting  views, documented so that the bases for
important decisions and SSC scope are recorded?
If the SRA/risk analyst did not identify any problems (or
inspection findings) with the scope of the licensee's SSCs for
(a)(4) assessments, then the SRA/risk analyst can conclude that,
based  on the inspection sample, the licensee has adequately
established the scope of SSCs required for the 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4)
assessment.  If the SRA/risk analyst identified problems with the
scope of the licensee's SSCs for (a)(4) assessments, then the
SRA/risk analyst needs to do the following:
a. Determine if the problems are the result of programmatic
weaknesses or failure to properly implement the program
(i.e., failure to follow Maintenance Rule procedures).
b. Assess the safety impact of the problems qualitatively, if
necessary.
c. Determine if the problems represented potential violations.
See Enforcement Manual for the most recent guidance.
03.02 Configuration Risk Assessments
Review the licensee's safety assessments of configurations during
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maintenance activities during power operation should be periods
when trains of components were removed from service or when
components from different trains are out of service simultaneously
for surveillance or maintenance.  In the case of shutdown
conditions, the selected time periods should be periods of reduced
reactor coolant system inventory, reduced shutdown cooling
availability, reduced electric power availability, or reduced
containment integrity.  Verify the licensee’s safety assessments
encompassed all the SSCs that have significant impact on public
health and safety, and determine  if the licensee adequately
evaluated the risks resulting from the surveillance or maintenance
activities.
In evaluating the licensee's prior maintenance activities, the
SRA/risk analyst should consider the following risk factors:
a. The likelihood that a given maintenance activity will
significantly increase the frequency of a risk-significant
initiating event (e.g., by an order of magnitude or more).
b. The probability that the activity will affect the ability to
mitigate the initiating event.
c. The probability that the activity will affect the ability to
use the containment as a measure of defense in depth.
Additionally, the SRA/risk analyst’s assessments should consider
the following factors:
a. Were multiple trains affected by the maintenance activity?
b. What assurances were made to prevent the concurrent
unavailability of important combinations of equipment
necessary for accident mitigation?
c. What methods were employed to determine the duration of the
maintenance and what was the projected duration?
In the event that the licensee chooses to use an approach such as
a matrix of predefined allowable configurations, the SRA/risk
analyst should determine the following:
a. What is the analytical basis for the allowed configurations?
(i.e., is the matrix based on quantitative or qualitative
considerations?)
b. What provisions exist for accommodating possible
configurations which are not encompassed by the matrix?  The
licensee should have a well-documented process which
specifies the procedures to be used in assessing the
acceptability of such a configuration.  Additionally,
licensee procedures should provide guidance for rapid
restoration of equipment to service if the plant
configuration is found to be either unacceptable or which
cannot be adequately assessed.
In the event that the licensee chooses to quantify the proposed
maintenance configurations using a "risk monitor" or an equivalent
configuration risk profile  methodology, if applicable, the SRA/risk
analyst should determine the following:
a. The underlying analysis should be sound with respect to the
technical attributes of the "risk monitor" model related to
scope, level of detail, and quality. (See Appendix A.)
b. Did the "risk monitor" model accurately reflect the actual
maintenance configuration?62709 - 10 - Issue Date: 12/28/00
c. Did the licensee validate the adequacy of the "risk monitor"
model compared to the PSA?
In reviewing the adequacy of the licensee’s risk assessment tools,
the SRA/risk analyst should verify the following:
a. Were external events (e.g., fire, flood, or seismic event)
considered in the risk assessment tool?
b. Were external conditions (e.g.,  inclement weather, electrical
grid stability) considered in the risk assessment tool?
If these items were not considered in the licensee’s risk
assessment tool, the SRA/risk analyst should request for additional
information to review the licensee’s bases for not considering
these aspects in the assessment tool.
In the event that the licensee has elected to assess risk by the
development of risk profile windows (i.e., assessed configurations
in a rolling maintenance schedule), the SRA/risk analyst should
determine if the licensee has appropriately utilized PSA insights
in developing these windows.  If problems are encountered while
assessing the licensee's risk profile windows for evaluating risk
due to maintenance, then the SRA/risk analyst should contact a
Headquarters PSA specialist for assistance to determine whether a
more detailed risk profile could be performed.
If the SRA/risk analyst did not identify any significant problems
with (or any inspection findings on) the licensee's process for
assessment of plant configuration risk resulting from maintenance
activities, then the SRA/risk analyst can conclude that, based on
the inspection sample, the licensee does not have problems
associated with the assessment of risk due to maintenance
activities.  If the SRA/risk analyst identified problems with the
licensee's process for assessment of plant configuration risk, then
the SRA/risk analyst needs to do the following:
a. Determine if the problems are the result of programmatic
weaknesses or failure to properly implement the program
(i.e., failure to follow procedures). 
b. The SRA/risk analyst should also assess the effect of the
weakness on plant safety.
c. Determine if the problems represented potential violations.
See Enforcement Manual for the most recent guidance.
03.03 Risk management
On the basis of the licensee's safety assessments of selected
maintenance configurations, determine if the licensee adequately
implemented the appropriate risk management actions for each of the
assessed plant maintenance configurations.  The following
categories of risk management actions should have been considered
by the licensee in the development of the procedures for risk
management of assessed plant configurations. 
a. Risk awareness and control
1. Was the planned maintenance activity discussed with the
operating shift?  Were the operators aware of the
maintenance activity and did they approve the planned
evolution?
2. Was a prejob briefing of the planned maintenance
evolution conducted for the maintenance personnel?Issue Date: 12/28/00 - 11 - 62709
3. Was approval by plant management obtained before entering
the configuration?
b. Reducing duration of maintenance activity
1. Did the licensee prestage parts and materials for the
maintenance activity?
2. Did the licensee conduct a walkdown of the tagouts and
maintenance activity prior to conducting maintenance?
3. Did the licensee conduct  training on mockups to
familiarize maintenance personnel with the activity?
4. Did the maintenance personnel perform maintenance around
the clock?
5. Did the licensee establish contingency plans to restore
out-of-service equipment rapidly if needed?
c. Minimizing magnitude of risk increases
1. Did the licensee minimize other work in areas (e.g., on
reactor protection system equipment areas, switchyard,
diesel generator rooms, electrical switchgear rooms) that
could increase the frequency of initiating events that
are mitigated by the safety function served by the out-
of-service SSCs?
2. Did the licensee minimize other work that could affect
redundant SSCs (e.g., reactor core isolation cooling/high
pressure coolant injection system rooms, auxiliary
feedwater pump rooms) so the safety functions provided by
the SSCs would more likely be available?
3. Did the licensee establish alternate success paths for
the performance of the safety function of the out-of-
service SSCs?
4. Did the licensee establish other compensatory measures?
If the SRA/risk analyst identified problems with the licensee's
process for risk management of plant configurations, then the
SRA/risk analyst shall assess the licensee's process(es) for
managing risk of maintenance activities.
a. Determine if the licensee has procedural requirements for
risk management actions for maintenance activities involving
plant maintenance configurations with risk increases
exceeding the action thresholds.
b. Determine if the guidance for risk management actions is
adequate and is being implemented.
If the SRA/risk analyst did not identify any significant problems
with(or inspection findings on) the licensee's management of plant
configuration risk resulting from maintenance activities, then the
SRA/risk analyst can conclude that, based on the inspection sample,
the licensee does not have problems with  managing the risk of
maintenance  activities.  If the SRA/risk analyst identified
problems with the licensee's management of plant configuration
risk, then the SRA/risk analyst needs to do the following:
a. Determine if the problems are the result of programmatic
weaknesses or failure to properly implement the program
(i.e., failure to follow procedures).62709 - 12 - Issue Date: 12/28/00
b. The SRA/risk analyst should also assess the effect on plant
safety resulting from this weakness.
c. Determine if the problems represented potential violations.
See Enforcement Manual for the most recent guidance.
62709-04 RESOURCE ESTIMATE
The resources required to complete this procedure will vary greatly
depending upon the nature of specific issues.  Generally a Regional
SRA or Headquarters Risk Analyst would be expected to need about 60
hours resources to perform this procedure.
62709-05 REFERENCES
U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR 50.65, "Requirements for
Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power
Plants"
Regulatory Guide 1.182, "Assessing and Managing Risk Before
Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants"
NUMARC 93-01, Section 11, "Assessment of Risk Resulting from
Performance of Maintenance Activities"
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APPENDIX A
CONSIDERATIONS IN REVIEWING PSA ATTRIBUTES
1. Scope of Analysis.  Where quantitative results are used,
the underlying analysis should be reviewed to understand
if the PSA is of sufficient scope to incorporate all of
the necessary SSCs.  For example, a typical Level 1 PSA
would not include SSCs related solely to containment
integrity.  Thus, reliance on such an analysis would
overlook the important SSCs related to containment
performance.  Similarly, systems related to spent fuel
pool cooling and radioactive waste disposal are not
typically addressed in such an analysis.  Some important
plant systems may only be applicable to shutdown
configurations and therefore would not be addressed by
the Level 1 PSAs.  (Level 1 PSAs are developed for the
plant conditions at full power operation.)  Additionally,
some important SSCs needed to cope with external
initiating events (such as fire, flood, and seismic
events) or external conditions (such as inclement weather
and electrical grid instability) are also not addressed
in the Level 1 PSA.  The scope of the PSA model used in
quantitative analyses should be examined to determine the
extent to which the baseline plant configuration has been
modeled.  The scope of the Maintenance Rule extends to a
variety of SSCs which are not commonly modeled in
traditional PSA studies.  The methods by which the
licensee incorporates known limitations of the scope of
the analysis should be evaluated to ensure that important
SSCs are not excluded from the (a)(4) assessments.  Where
it has been shown that the PSA model is not of sufficient
scope to incorporate all of the relevant SSCs for the
(a)(4) assessment  process, the licensee should
demonstrate that a qualitative decision-making process
has addressed the deficiencies.
2. Level of Detail.  The licensee's PSA model must be of
sufficient detail to support decisions regarding SSC
scope determinations.  Ideally, the PSA model should
visibly and accurately treat dependencies and interfaces
among the plant safety functions, system responses, and
operator actions needed for accident mitigation.  For
(a)(4) assessments, the PSA model should include both
front-line/support  system dependencies and support
system/support system dependencies to the extent that
these inter-system dependencies would have a significant
effect on the key plant safety functions.  Typically, the
licensee’s PSA documentation would provide dependency
matrices which show the systematic evaluation of inter-
system dependencies.  If the modeling of inter-system
dependencies is determined to be inadequate, the licensee
should either revise the PSA to address the inter-system
dependencies or add the SSCs to the scope of (a)(4)
assessments.  The modeling of SSCs with respect to
component boundaries can be an important  factor in
determining the level of detail in the PSA model.  One
important issue is whether electrical power breakers are
included within the component boundaries for individual
pieces of equipment.  Similarly, certain auxiliary
equipment (cooling fans, lube oil pumps, etc.) is often
subsumed within the component boundary of larger
components.  Many complex systems are commonly modeled as
super components or "black boxes" in PSA studies (e.g.,
diesel generators, certain relay/logic switching
circuits, turbine trip systems).  Since the concern of
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that the component supports, the phrase "SSCs modeled in
the PSA" should be interpreted as identifying the
systems, trains, and portions of systems that mitigate
accident conditions.  If the licensee's implementation of
the Maintenance Rule (a)(4) requirements does not address
the limitations of the PSA model associated with the
determination of the scope of SSCs,  inappropriate
decisions may result.  The modeling of support system
dependencies should be evaluated to determine its
adequacy to support the types of decisions which are
being made.  In those areas where the level of detail in
support system modeling may not be sufficient, the
licensee's qualitative decision-making process should
address the deficiencies.
3. Quality of Analysis.  The overall quality of the PSA must
be sufficient if it is to be used to support quantitative
and/or qualitative decisions of safety significance.  In
this context, quality refers to various attributes of the
data, assumptions, and  methodology which have been used,
as well as consistency of the results.  Additionally, the
PSA should have been subjected to some type of formal
review process.  Ideally, the review process should
include both internal and external peer reviews.  Also,
a comparison of other studies based on similar plant
designs could provide important insights.  Any
significant deviations between the comparison study and
the licensee's PSA should be fully understood.
With respect to the reliability and unavailability data used
in the PSA analyses, the data should reflect plant-specific
information to the maximum extent practicable.  This data
should be subjected to periodic reviews by the licensee and
updated on a periodic and as-needed basis.  The data should
be of sufficient fidelity to provide meaningful results,
i.e., the data should be derived from valid operational and
test results.  The empirical bases for the licensee's
reliability and availability estimates should be evaluated to
determine if the  supporting information reflects actual
observed operational experience, i.e., for a sample of 20
SSCs, compare the assumed estimates with actual plant records
to determine whether the assumptions are consistent with
actual observations.  It is not expected that actual
statistical estimations of SSC reliability are to be
performed;  rather, actual observed failure rates and
unavailability hours should be compared with those assumed in
the PSA.
Reliability data should also be consistent with industry
operating experience, i.e., the basis for an SSC reliability
estimate should include considerations of unique operational
problems with a particular SSC in other similar facilities
that would be applicable to the licensee’s facility.
Licensee event reports (LERs), accident sequence precursor
(ASP) reports, vendor information bulletins, and other
information should provide insights for developing a more
realistic best estimate of SSC reliability.
The basic assumptions used in the PSA can influence the
decision-making process.  Overly conservative assumptions
could elevate the importance of certain SSCs and mask the
true importance of others.  For example, a given success
criterion which specifies that two out of three pumps be
available when in fact only one pump is required would
represent an unnecessary conservatism.  This could cause PSA
importance measures associated with the pumps to be
artificially higher, and possibly mask the importance of
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the reliability or maintenance unavailability of SSCs could
also skew the results.  For example, concurrent outages of
equipment could cause changes in the relative importance of
individual SSCs.  Therefore, the impact of these systemic
effects on the relative risk ranking of SSCs must be
carefully evaluated, if the licensee has chosen to exclude
low safety-significant SSCs from the scope of (a)(4)
assessments.  The licensee should evaluate these effects on
the risk ranking methodology to support the bases for
excluding any particular low safety-significant SSC from the
(a)(4) assessment scope.
4. Uncertainty.  As with any PSA calculation, the numerical
results of the (a)(4) safety assessments are subject to
uncertainty.  The concern in every case is whether the
uncertainties alter the decision being made.  In general,
the types of uncertainty that impact PSA results are
parameter  uncertainty, model uncertainty, and
completeness uncertainty.  Although most PSA computer
codes have the capability to calculate the uncertainty
distribution due to propagation of uncertainties in
individual parameters through the PSA model, a formal
uncertainty analysis may not be necessary if the state-
of-knowledge  correlation is shown to be unimportant.
This involves a demonstration that most of the
contributing scenarios (cutsets or accident sequences) do
not involve multiple events that rely on the same
parameter for their quantification.  Furthermore, the
acceptable risk management action thresholds are set at
sufficiently low values that the need for an uncertainty
analysis of the risk estimates for a maintenance
configuration may not be necessary.  With regard to PSA
model uncertainty and completeness, sensitivity studies
may be performed to evaluate the impact of uncertainties
in specific assumptions on the predicted PSA numerical
results.  The licensee could use the sensitivity study
results or qualitative arguments to show that the PSA
results are insensitive to uncertainties, and therefore,
that the numerical values of point estimates can be used
as reasonable risk metrics for practical purposes.
5. Truncation.  In quantifying the PSA model, truncation
limits are imposed to manage the size and number of
cutsets and sequences.  Depending on the risk model and
quantification tool, the truncation cutoff values will
vary.  The truncation limit should be low enough that
there is convergence toward a stable result.  To ensure
that determinations of the  scope of SSCs for (a)(4)
assessments are not affected by truncated events and
sequences, the total number of post-truncation cutsets
and the core damage frequency (CDF) value should not be
impacted by the selected cutoff values.  Ideally,
sensitivity studies could be performed to show that
conclusions on the SSC scope would not be affected when
higher truncation limits (1E-8 to 1E-9) were used.  If a
PSA model has a modularized logic structure (i.e., module
of basic events structured as a supercomponent), the
extent of modularization must be evaluated to determine
the reasonableness of a selected truncation limit.
With the fast-calculating algorithms in current PSA software
and current computers, cutoffs at 1E-11 are quite easily
achieved.  Ideally, a full requantification of the PSA is
desirable to ensure that all low likelihood events associated
with highly reliable SSCs are included in the final scope of
SSCs for (a)(4) assessments.  In certain plant
configurations, these low likelihood events may become
important contributors to the plant risk profile.62709 A-4 Issue Date: 12/28/00
The truncation limit imposed by the licensee on the PSA
results should be evaluated.  When cutoffs higher than 1E-9
are used, results should be carefully reviewed.  If the PSA
model is modularized, a truncation limit of 1E-9 might
actually be closer to a 1E-11 limit once the PSA logic
structure is demodularized.  If a presolved cutset model is
used, the licensee should demonstrate that enough cutsets
have been retained to ensure that a few dominant sequences
cannot hide the contribution of other potentially important
sequences.  Therefore, the selected truncation value should
be verified to ensure a very high percentage (e.g., 98
percent) of total risk is covered.
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APPENDIX B
QUALITATIVE JUDGMENT FOR SCOPING DETERMINATION
PSA insights should be used to complement traditional engineering
considerations.  The licensee should consider quantitative and
qualitative PSA results in conjunction with traditional engineering
evaluations and operating experience to make an integrated
assessment of the safety significance of the SSCs when determining
the scope of SSCs for (a)(4) assessments.  NUMARC 93-01 provides
general guidance on how to determine the scope of SSCs for (a)(4)
assessments.  SSCs determined by quantitative PSA results to be low
safety-significant can be excluded from the scope of (a)(4)
assessments using qualitative judgment.  The Maintenance Rule
expert panel may be used to facilitate these determinations.  The
Maintenance Rule expert panel decision-making process should
provide consistent decision outputs on the SSC scope.  For example,
the panel's decisions should be similar even when the panel is
comprised of different individuals.  The licensee should be able to
provide documentation supporting  the rationale behind the decision-
making on the SSC scope for review.
END